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Abstract
We study cascades on a two-layer multiplex network, with asymmetric feedback that
depends on the coupling strength between the layers. Based on an analytical branching
process approximation, we calculate the systemic risk measured by the final fraction of failed
nodes on a reference layer. The results are compared with the case of a single layer network
that is an aggregated representation of the two layers. We find that systemic risk in the two-
layer network is smaller than in the aggregated one only if the coupling strength between
the two layers is small. Above a critical coupling strength, systemic risk is increased because
of the mutual amplification of cascades in the two layers. We even observe sharp phase
transitions in the cascade size that are less pronounced on the aggregated layer. Our insights
can be applied to a scenario where firms decide whether they want to split their business into
a less risky core business and a more risky subsidiary business. In most cases, this may lead
to a drastic increase of systemic risk, which is underestimated in an aggregated approach.
1 Introduction
Cascading failures in complex systems can be understood as a process by which the initial failure
of a small set of individual components leads to the failure a significant fraction of the system’s
components. This is due to interconnections between the different components of the system. Such
a phenomenon can occur in physical systems such as power grids (e.g. Carreras et al. (2004),
Kinney et al. (2005) and Brummitt et al. (2012)), but also in complex organizations like interbank
systems (e.g. Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Gai and Kapadia (2010), Battiston et al. (2012) and
Amini et al. (2010)). A general framework to study such cascading failures in networked systems
was developed in Lorenz et al. (2009), and extended recently to work in more general topologies
in Burkholz et al. (2015).
In many situations, cascading failures can be influenced by the combination of different types
of interactions between the individual components of the system. This is the case in interbank
systems, where banks are exposed to each other via different types of financial obligations (loans,
derivative contracts, etc.) (e.g. Arinaminpathy et al. (2012) and Montagna and Kok (2013)). The
bankruptcy of a bank can thus cascade to other banks in non-standard ways. Another example
are firms diversifying their activities across different business units, each of which is exposed to
cascade risk in its own field of activity.
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An important question we wish to investigate in this article is how diversification across different
types of interactions can affect the risk of cascading failures. For that purpose, we study the
case of a firm that diversifies its activities across a core-business unit and a subsidiary-business
unit. Each business unit is exposed to other firms’ business units in the same sector of business
activity (either core or subsidiary). This means that a business unit can fail (i.e. go bankrupt)
as a result of a cascade of failures (i.e. bankruptcies) in the same sector of business activity.
The question of the structuring of a firm into sub-units has been studied from a different angle
in the financial economics literature (e.g. Lewellen (1971) and Maksimovic and Phillips (2002))
and often focuses on the efficiency of the allocation of its resources across different industries.
Another question that has received some attention is that of whether a firm can diversify the
risk of its income streams by operating in different business areas. Namely, Levy and Sarnat
(1970), Smith and Schreiner (1969) and Amihud and Lev (1981) studied how conglomerates can
diversify the risk associated with their revenue streams from the perspective of portfolio theory.
Here, we use a complex networks approach and we view the system of firm activities as an
interconnected multi-layered network (see D’Agostino and Scala (2014); Gao et al. (2012); Garas
(2015); Kivelä et al. (2014)). The distinct layers of this network contain individual networks
defined by a particular type of interactions according to a given business activity, while the inter-
connections between layers allow for cross-layer interactions. In this setting we develop a model
where failures (i.e. bankruptcies) on two different network layers affect firms asymmetrically:
The first layer represents exposures between the firms in the core business while the second layer
represents exposures between firms in the subsidiary business. Failure (i.e. bankruptcy) of a
firm’s core business unit implies failure of its subsidiary business unit, whereas failure of a firm’s
subsidiary business unit only causes a shock to the firm’s resistance threshold in its core business
unit (see Fig. 1 for an illustration). We find that when the coupling strength from the core to
the subsidiary layer is varied only slightly, there is a sharp transition between a safe regime,
where there is no cascade of failures, and a catastrophic regime, where there is a full cascade of
failures. Moreover, when comparing the two-layer network to the single-layer network formed by
aggregating the two layers, we find that cascades can be larger on the two-layer network than
on the aggregated one. On the other hand, by varying the strength of the feedback between the
two layers, we identify the existence of a regime where the two-layer network is safer than the
aggregated one and another regime where the reverse holds. This points to the critical importance
of the coupling of the layers when structuring a firm into different business units. Also, dealing
with aggregated network data that ignores the fine structure of the coupling between different
layers can lead to significant underestimation or overestimation of cascade risk.
The article is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe the two-layer cascade model. In
Section 3, we derive a branching process approximation as an approximation for large networks
and use it to analyze the aforementioned phenomena. These phenomena are presented in Section
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Core Business
Subsidiary Business
Figure 1: Illustration of a system with asymmetrically coupled layers. A failure (or bankruptcy)
on the Core Business layer implies a failure on the Subsidiary Business layer. This coupling is
illustrated by an inter-layer dependency link (red arrow). On the other hand, a failure on the
Subsidiary Business layer only decreases a node’s failure threshold on the Core Business layer.
This coupling is illustrated using dashed black arrows. The intra-layer links represent business
relations or other forms of interactions due to normal business.
4 where we compare our analytical results with simulations and analyse further the observed
phase transitions. In Section 5, we conclude and interpret the consequences of our theoretical
investigations for the application to networks of firms that might decide about merging their core
and their subsidiary business.
2 Model
We first consider a finite model with N firms. Each firm can be represented by a node i present on
each of two different layers: layer 0 (the core-business layer) and layer 1 (the subsidiary-business
layer). Each layer l ∈ {0, 1} has a topology represented by an adjacency matrix Gl. On each
layer l, node i can be in one of two states sil ∈ {0, 1}, healthy (sil = 0) or failed (sil = 1).
si0 = 1 represents the bankruptcy of firm i’s core-business unit, whereas si1 = 1 represents the
bankruptcy of its subsidiary-business unit. This state is determined by two other variables: a
node’s fragility on a given layer φil, which accumulates the load a node carries, and its threshold
θil on that layer, which determines the amount of load it can carry without failing. Whenever the
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fragility exceeds the threshold φil ≥ θil , the node fails on that layer and cannot recover at a later
point in time.
On each layer, we assume that a cascade of failures spreads according to the threshold failure
mechanism of Watts (2002). Thus a node fails if a sufficient fraction of its neighbors have failed.
The fragility of a node i of degree kl on layer l (i.e. a node with kl neighbors on layer l) can be
expressed as
φil(kl) =
1
kl
∑
j∈nbl(i)
sjl =
nl
kl
(1)
where nbl(i) is the set of nodes in i’s neighborhood on layer l and nl is the number of failed
neighbors on layer l. This failure mechanism is useful to model a firm diversifying its exposure
to failure risk across neighbors: the more neighbors a node has, the less it is exposed to the
failure of a single neighbor. A cascade of failures thus starts with an initial fraction of failed
nodes. These failures can then spread to their neighbors in discrete time steps. The load φil of a
node i is thus updated at each time step t. This model has been studied extensively on single-
layer networks, in the context of configuration model type random graphs with a given degree
distribution (Amini et al., 2010; Dodds and Payne, 2009; Gleeson and Cahalane, 2007; Payne
et al., 2009; Tessone et al., 2013) or trees (Hurd and Gleeson, 2013), and has been adapted to
financial networks of interbank lending (Battiston et al., 2012; Gai and Kapadia, 2010; Roukny
et al., 2013). In Burkholz et al. (2015) a mesoscopic perspective is added by studying conditional
failure probabilities given the degree of node. Generalizations of the model to weighted networks
can be found in Amini et al. (2010); Hurd and Gleeson (2013) and Burkholz et al. (2015).
We extend Watts’ model to a multiplex setting with non-symmetric dependence between the
layers. The two network layers are related by partial dependency links (see Fig. 1). These are
directed links connecting a node on layer 0 to its alter ego on layer 1. These links are characterized
by weights r01, r10 ∈ [0, 1] affecting the size of a shock to a node’s threshold on a given layer
following a failure on the other layer. Namely, the failure of node i on layer 1 reduces its threshold
θi0 on layer 0 in the following way
θi,r0 = (1− r10)θi0, (2)
while the failure of node i on layer 0 reduces its threshold θi1 on layer 1 in the following way
θi,r1 = (1− r01)θi1. (3)
In the remainder of this article, we will set r01 = 1. Thus, the failure of node i on layer 0 (the
core-business layer) automatically leads to its failure on layer 1 (the subsidiary-business layer),
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since its shocked threshold becomes θi,r1 = 0 and the failure condition φ
i
1 ≥ θi,r1 is trivially
satisfied even in the absence of any failed neighbors on layer 1. On the other hand, we allow
r10 to take values in [0, 1]. For r10 = 1, both layers are fully inter-dependent, meaning that the
failure of a node on one layer implies its failure on the other. In this special case we have normal
dependency links between the two layers as introduced in Buldyrev et al. (2010). For r10 = 0,
the failure of a node on layer 1 does not affect its failure on layer 0. For r10 ∈ (0, 1), we have an
asymmetric inter-dependency between layers. In the remainder we call r10 the coupling strength
between the two layers.
This models our case of interest, where layer 0 is interpreted as a firm’s activities in a core
business, whereas layer 1 can be interpreted as a firm’s activities in a subsidiary business. The
failure of the firm in the subsidiary business does not necessarily imply its failure in the core
business, but the loss incurred reduces its ability to withstand the failure of neighbors in the core-
business. The failure of the firm in the core business however implies its failure in the subsidiary
business. It is thus logical to choose the fraction of failed nodes on layer 0 when the cascade has
reached steady state as the appropriate measure of systemic risk, i.e.
ρ∗N = lim
t→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
si0 (4)
3 Local tree approximation
In order to make the model analytically tractable, in this section we restrict ourselves to a
special class of configuration type multiplex networks. For these, we assume that each node is
characterized by two degrees, k0, k1, and two thresholds, θ0, θ1, which can be different on layers
l ∈ {0, 1}. These values are drawn independently from the degree distributions pl(kl) and the
cumulative threshold distributions Fl(θl).
In the limit of infinite networks, the clustering coefficient that quantifies the chance that any
two neighbors of a given node are also neighbors converges to zero. It means that the network is
locally tree-like, i.e., it does not contain short cycles. This then allows us to develop a branching
process approximation for the final fraction of failed nodes ρ∗l := limN→∞ ρ
∗
l,N on each layer l in
the limit of infinite network size. This approximation is valid for arbitrary degree distributions
with finite second moments (Molloy and Reed, 1995; Newman et al., 2001). For our model, the
risk measure is ρ∗ = ρ∗0, i.e., the fraction of failed nodes in layer 0 only. However, in order to
calculate ρ∗, we need to calculate both ρ∗l , as failures on the two layers are mutually dependent.
A node fails initially if it has a negative threshold. Consequently, F0(θ0 = 0) and F1(θ1 = 0)
define, for each layer, the initial fraction of failed nodes. These failures can lead to cascades that
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evolve until the steady states ρ∗l on the two layers are reached. We can express the ρ
∗
l as averages
with respect to the degree distribution pl(kl) which we take as input to our model:
ρ∗l =
∑
kl
pl(kl)P(sl = 1|kl) (5)
P(sl = 1|kl) is the conditional probability that a node with a given degree kl on layer l fails in
layer l. In order to calculate this probability, the local tree approximation is essential as it allows
us to treat failures of neighbors of a given node as independent events that happen with a failure
probability pi∗l . Consequently, the number nl of failed neighbors of a node of degree kl in layer l
follows a binomial distribution so that nl neighbors are failed with probability
B(nl, kl, pi
∗
l ) :=
(
kl
nl
)
(1− pi∗l )kl−nl (pi∗l )nl . (6)
This allows us to express P(sl = 1|kl) as:
P(sl = 1|kl) =
kl∑
nl=0
B(nl, kl, pi
∗
l )P
(
sl = 1|kl, nl, ρ∗s,1−l
)
, (7)
where P(sl = 1|kl, nl, ρ∗s,1−l) is the probability that a node fails in layer l given that exactly nl
of its kl neighbors failed. This failure results from the fact that the fraction of failed nodes nl/kl
exceeded the threshold. This was the original threshold θl with a probability (1−ρ∗s,1−l) because
the node did not fail in layer (1 − l). Or it was the reduced threshold θl(1 − r(1−l)(l)) with a
probability ρ∗s,1−l because the node failed in layer (1− l) before. Consequently, we have:
P
(
sl = 1|kl, nl, ρ∗s,1−l
)
=
(
1− ρ∗s,1−l
)
Fl
(
nl
kl
)
+ ρ∗s,1−lFl
(
cl
nl
kl
)
. (8)
Fl (nl/kl) is the probability that the original threshold is exceeded, whereas Fl (clnl/kl) is the
probability that the reduced threshold is exceeded, where c0 := 1/(1− r10) and c1 :=∞.
Note that ρ∗s,1−l differs from ρ
∗
1−l used in Eqn. (5). It gives us only the conditional probability
that the node has failed in layer (1 − l), given that it has not failed in layer l. It depends on a
neighbor’s failure probability on the other layer, pi∗1−l, via
ρ∗s,1−l =
∑
k1−l
p1−l(k1−l)
k1−l∑
nl=0
B(nl, k1−l, pi∗1−l) F1−l
(
n1−l
k1−l
)
. (9)
Eqn. (9) has the same structure as the branching process approximation for the fraction of
failed nodes on single layers (Gleeson and Cahalane, 2007). It also has a structure similar to
Eqs. (5)-(7), with the only difference of a simpler response function, i.e., P(sl = 1|kl, nl, ρ∗s,1−l) =
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F1−l(n1−l/k1−l), which is the probability that the fraction of failed neighbors exceeds the original
threshold in layer (1− l).
In order to compute Eqn. (7), we need to know the failure probability pi∗l of a neighbor in layer l.
To achieve this, we iteratively solve a system of coupled fixed-point equations for the probabilities
pi∗l , defined as
pi∗l = Ll (pi
∗
l ) :=
1
zl
∑
kl
pl(kl)kl
kl−1∑
nl=0
B(nl, kl − 1, pi∗l )P
(
sl = 1|kl, nl, ρ∗s,1−l
)
(10)
where zl =
∑
kl
pl(kl)kl and P(sl = 1|kl, nl, ρ∗s,1−l) is defined by Eqn. (8)
We note again similarities between Eqn. (10) that describes the failure probability of a neighbor
and Eqs. (5), (8) that describe the failure probability of a node, but also two differences:
a) In Eqn. (10) the degree distribution of a neighbor follows pl(kl)kl/zl instead of pl(kl) for a
node (Newman, 2010). It is proportional to the degree kl, since every link of a neighbor increases
the probability of the neighbor to be connected to the node under consideration.
b) The binomial distribution in Eqn. (10) depends on kl − 1 instead of kl because we have to
take into account the second-order neighborhood of the node under consideration. We take the
failure probability of a neighbor as input to calculate the failure probability of the node under
consideration as in Eqs. (5), (8). Therefore, pi∗l is conditioned on the event that the node under
consideration has not failed before the neighbor. Only kl − 1 neighbors of the neighbor with
degree kl can have possibly failed before, because the node under consideration is a neighbor of
this neighbor.
4 Results
4.1 Comparison with computer simulations
We now compare our numerical solution of the fixed point equations (10) with computer sim-
ulations, using the illustrative case of an uncorrelated, two-layer Erdős-Rényi network (Erdős
and Rényi, 1959). For the computer simulations, we implement the time-dependent model as
described in Sect. 2, i.e. we simulate the evolution of cascades until they reach the steady state.
The network size is N = 10, 000 for each layer. Further, we sample over 100 network realiza-
tions for every initial condition. The degree distributions pl(kl) on each layer are approximately
Poisson distributions
pl(kl) =
zkll
kl!
e−zl (11)
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Figure 2: Sharp Regime Change in Threshold-Feedback Model: ρ∗0 for different combinations
of threshold distributions, as the coupling strength r10 is varied. The threshold distribution on
the core-business layer is set to N (0.3, 0.12) while the threshold distribution on the subsidiary-
business layer is N (0.6, 0.12) (black curve), N (0.5, 0.52) (green curve) and N (0.2, 0.52) (blue
curve). The two layers are independent Erdős-Rényi networks with mean degrees z0 = z1 = 5.
The dotted lines are the curves predicted by our analytics, while with the open symbols we show
simulation results on Erdős-Rényi networks with 10000 nodes where each point is averaged over
100 realizations. The error bars indicate the size of the standard error.
with identical mean degrees z0 = z1. The thresholds are normally distributed, i.e. θ0 ∼ N (µ0, σ20)
and θ1 ∼ N (µ1, σ21) with different parameters µl, σl. In our case, we fix the threshold distribution
on layer 0 to parameters µ0 = 0.3 and σ0 = 0.1, which ensures that the failure probability for
the nodes in an uncoupled network would be very small, i.e., 0.0045. We vary the parameters µ1
and σ1 of layer 1, to study the emergence of large cascades on layer 0 because of the coupling
with strength r10.
Figure 2 demonstrates that a small variation in the coupling strength r10 may result in a rapid
shift from a regime with almost no failures (ρ∗0 ≈ 0) to a regime of complete system failure
(ρ∗0 ≈ 1). The coupling strength at the onset of this regime shift, rc10, depends on the parameters
of the threshold distribution on layer 1 (i.e. µ1 and σ1). Namely, rc10 is increasing in µ1. For
certain parameter constellations (e.g. µ1 = 0.6 and σ2 = 0.1), we also find no failure cascades at
all, which will be further discussed in Fig. 4. Finally, we note the excellent match between the
numerical and the simulation results. The differences in the slope result from the fact that we
have simulated finite networks, whereas the fixed point equations holds for infinite networks.
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4.2 Impact of the coupling strength
To gain a broader understanding of how the coupling between the two layers can cause such
a rapid transition from a low-risk regime (i.e. ρ∗0 ≈ 0) to a catastrophic one (i.e. ρ∗0 ≈ 1), we
calculate the (µ1, σ1) phase diagram for various coupling strengths. The results are shown in Fig.
3, where dark areas indicate parameter constellations with a very high fraction of failed nodes.
The left column shows the measure of systemic risk ρ∗0, which is equivalent to the fraction of
failed nodes in layer 0, whereas the middle column shows the corresponding fraction of failed
nodes in layer 1.
As a reference case, the right column shows a single-layer network, which we constructed in order
to put the results for the two-layer network into perspective. Nodes in this combined single-layer
network have a degree kagg = k0 + k1 and a threshold θagg = θ0 + θ1, i.e. we simply sum up
the two values per node that were distributed on the two layers before. The degree distribution
can be found using the convolution of p0(k0) and p1(k1), i.e. pagg(kagg) = (p0 ∗ p1)(kagg). The
latter can be shown to be a Poisson distribution with mean degree zagg = z0 + z1, which is
the degree distribution of an infinite Erdős-Rényi network. The threshold distribution for the
combined layers can be found by taking the convolution of the probability density functions of
θ0 and θ1. This yields θagg ∼ N (µagg, σ2agg), where µagg = µ0 + µ1 and σagg =
√
σ20 + σ
2
1.
Our reference case is motivated by two considerations: (a) We want to estimate the error made if
a multiplex network is approximated by a single layer network, i.e. the properties of the different
layers are simply aggregated in one layer. (b) For the application scenario at hand, namely
the management decision of firms to merge their core and subsidiary business units into one
business, we want to understand the impact on the resulting risk exposure. To calculate the
phase diagram, we assume that all firms make the same decision, which for example could be
motivated by herding behavior.
Since we vary only (µ1, σ1), we plot all phase diagrams with respect to these two parameters.
Because the combined layer network no longer contains the coupling strength r10, the respective
phase plots do not change by varying r10. They are merely repeated for the purpose of comparison
with the other columns. We hypothesize that nodes in the combined layer network have a smaller
failure probability compared to the two-layer network because their threshold is much higher.
Their degree is also larger, which implies that the risk is better diversified among the neighbors.
On the other hand, because of the larger degrees, there is a higher connectivity in the combined
layer network. This has the potential to amplify small cascades more than in the less connected
separate layers. We will investigate, by means of numerical solutions of the fixed point equations,
which of these antagonistic effects may dominate in a given parameter region.
By comparing the first and third columns in Fig. 3, we see a different risk profile for small and
for large coupling strengths. For small values of r10 the cascades on layer 1 cannot propagate to
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Figure 3: Sharp Regime Change in Threshold-Feedback Model: ρ∗0 and ρ∗1 for µ0 = 0.3, σ0 =
0.1 and (µ1, σ1) ∈ [0, 1]2 as r10 is varied. The two layers are independent Erdős-Rényi networks
with mean degrees z0 = z1 = 5 and thresholds on each layer are independently distributed, i.e.
θ0 ∼ N (0.3, 0.12) and θ1 ∼ N (µ1, σ21), where (µ1, σ1) ∈ [0, 1]2. ρ∗agg is the fraction of failures on
the aggregated network, i.e. a network where kagg = k0 + k1 and θagg = θ0 + θ1.
layer 0, therefore we do not observe any systemic risk. This is different for the combined layer
network, where large cascades can occur for a small range of parameters.
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Figure 4: Sharp Regime Change in Threshold-Feedback Model: ρ∗0 and ρ∗1 for µ0 = 0.3, σ0 =
0.1 and σ1 = 0.3 as µ1 and r10 are varied. The two layers are independent Erdős-Rényi net-
works with mean degrees z0 = z1 = 5 and the thresholds on each layer are independently dis-
tributed, i.e. θ0 ∼ N (0.3, 0.12) and θ1 ∼ N (µ1, 0.32), where µ1 ∈ [0, 1]. ρ∗agg is the fraction of
failures on the aggregated network, i.e. a network where kagg = k0 + k1 and θagg = θ0 + θ1.
The picture is inverted for larger values of r10. Here we find, by increasing r10, an increasing
region of high systemic risk that is driven by the mutual amplification of cascades between the two
layers. This leads to a very sharp phase transition, i.e. a clear separation of regions with complete
breakdown and regions with no breakdown. We note that this differs from the observation for
the combined layer network, where the phase transition can also be observed. However, there
are extended regions where the systemic risk is at intermediate levels, as indicated by the gray
areas.
We also wish to see how the onset of systemic risk on layer 0 depends on the coupling strength
r10. Thus, in addition to fixing µ0 and σ0, we set σ1 to a small value and plot the phase diagram
with respect to (µ1, r10). Fig. 4, for the same columns as in Fig. 3, shows that there is indeed
a critical value rc10 which is independent of µ1. Below rc10, we do not observe any systemic risk
in layer 0, whereas in the combined layer network, we find a considerable systemic risk for small
values of µ1. Above rc10, we see in the two-layer network a sharp phase transition between full
and no systemic risk that depends on a critical value µc1. Consequently, we study the transition
line r10(µ1) in the following subsection.
4.3 Scaling behavior
In Fig. 3 we observe that the sharp phase transition scales almost linearly for large enough
coupling strength r10, i.e.
σ1 = s1µ1 + s0 for µ1 ≥ 0.4, r10 ≥ rc10 (12)
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Figure 5: (Left): Red Circles: Slope s1 of the linear phase transition obtained by linear regres-
sion of ρ∗0 that we calculated by solving the fixed point equations (10) numerically for different
values of r10. The blue curve shows the approximate values for the slopes provided by Eqn. 19.
(Middle): Phase diagram for the final cascade size on a single layer without threshold feedback
for Poisson random graphs with average degree z = 5 and normally distributed thresholds
Fθ ∼ N
(
µ, σ2
)
. (Right): Final cascade size on layer 0, i.e. ρ∗0, for r10 = 0.3. The red line
marks the phase transition defined by the criterion ρ∗single ≥ ρcs,1. The green line corresponds to
ρ∗single ≥ 0.45.
In order to determine the scaling parameter s1, we take the phase transition line from the phase
diagrams of Fig. 3, which were also calculated for r10 =0.3, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.9. These lines are
approximated by a linear regression, and the slopes obtained this way are plotted in Fig. 5 (left,
red dots) against the coupling strength r10. We observe a non-monotonous dependence of the
slope, with a saturation effect for large r10. Thus, we want to determine rc10 and s1(r10) for
r10 ≥ rc10 .
To better understand this dependence, we perform a linear approximation of L0 in Eqn. (10) as
L0 (pi0) ≈ a+ bpi0 (13)
which is valid for small values of the failure probability pi0. Instead of solving the full system of
fixed point equations Eqn. (10), we only solve the linearized system in order to deduce criteria
for the growth behavior of pi0 in the fixed point iterations. The fixed point of the linear equation
(13) exceeds one if
a
1− b ≥ 1 (14)
Under this condition, initial failures in both layers result in large cascades in layer 0.
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Eqn. (14) leads to conditions for the parameters µc1, σc1 and rc10 if we know the expressions for a
and b. These are obtained from the linearization of Eqn. (10):
a =P
(
s0 = 1|k0, n0 = 0, ρ∗s,1
)
,
b =
∞∑
k0=1
k0(k0 − 1)
z0
p0 (k0)× (15)
× [P (s0 = 1|k0, n0 = 1, ρ∗s,1)− P (s0 = 1|k0, n0 = 0, ρ∗s,1)] .
These parameters depend on the failure probability ρ∗s,1 of a node in the other layer, i.e. layer 1.
For the further discussion, we first concentrate on the worst case scenario ρ∗s,1 = 1, i.e. all nodes
failed on layer 1. We are interested in identifying the regime where even in the worst case,
cascades in layer 1 do not propagate to layer 0. In other words, we want to approximate the
critical coupling rc10 above which we can observe regions of high systemic risk in the left column
of Fig. 4. With ρ∗s,1 = 1 the parameters a and b simplify to
a = F0(0),
b =
∞∑
k0=1
k0(k0 − 1)
z0
p0 (k0)
[
F0
(
1
k0 (1− r10)
)
− F0(0)
]
.
(16)
We note that these are independent of µ1, σ1. For the set of parameters used in Fig. 4, we
obtain with the help of Eqn. (15) and Eqn. (14) the value of the critical coupling rc10 = 0.204.
In comparison with the numerical calculation r10 = 0.18, which takes the full set of fixed point
equations into account, this is a good approximation. That means large cascades can propagate
from layer 1 to layer 0 above a critical coupling strength rc10 ' 0.2. This holds independently of
µ1 and σ1.
Next we explain the dependence s1(r10) as shown in Fig. 3. By this we estimate the slope of
the phase transition line (which is of the form σ1 ∝ s1µ1). Again, we deduce this relation from
Eqs. (14), (15), but this time we cannot use ρ∗s,1 = 1. For ρ∗s,1 6= 1, we automatically obtain a
dependence on the threshold parameters µ1 and σ1 of layer 1. Combining Eqn. (15) and Eqn.
(14), we can define a critical value ρcs,1 such that Eqn. (14) is satisfied for ρ∗s,1 ≥ ρcs,1:
ρcs,1 :=
1 + F0(0)(z0 − 1)− c0(0)
c0(r)− c0(0) , (17)
where
c0(r) :=
∞∑
k0=1
k0(k0 − 1)
z0
p0 (k0)F0
(
1
k0 (1− r10)
)
. (18)
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This is a reformulation of Eqn. (14), which gives us an estimation of when to expect large cascades
in layer 0. Still, we do not know ρ∗s,1 without solving the full system of fixed point equations
(10). In the following we test two proxies for ρ∗s,1 which lead us to a linear dependence between
µ1 and σ1.
(1) The initial value ρs,1(t = 0) = F1(0) = Φ (−µ1/σ1) is already enough to determine the growth
of pi0 in the early stages of the fixed point iterations. Especially for larger values of r10, a large
cascade in layer 0 might be already triggered just by the initial failures in layer 1. Therefore, we
set ρcs,1 ' F1(0), which results in
σ1 ∝ −µ1/Φ−1
(
ρcs,1
)
, (19)
i.e.,
s1 = −1/Φ−1
(
ρcs,1
)
(20)
where Φ−1 denotes the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution.
We plot this slope using a blue line in Fig. 5(left), to demonstrate the good agreement of our
approximation with the numerical slopes s1 for r10 ≥ 0.4.
(2) For smaller coupling strengths r10 we test a second proxy for ρ∗s,1. A lower bound for ρ∗s,1
is given by the final cascade size on a single layer ρ∗single, where no feedback mechanism with
another layer exists. That means, the other layer cannot further amplify the failures. Cascades in
single layers have been studied in Burkholz et al. (2015). We use their approach to plot a phase
diagram for the final cascade size for Poisson random graphs with average degree z = 5, shown
in the middle panel of Fig. 5.
When we compare the plots of Fig. 3 (left) with Fig. 5 (middle), we observe that in the parameter
regions in Fig. 3 (left) where no cascades occur, also no cascades occur in Fig. 5 (middle). This
holds only for strong couplings r10. Consequently, in this limit, our second proxy for ρ∗s,1 gives
similar results as our first proxy.
However, the second proxy for ρ∗s,1, is the more general one as we can also correctly cover the
transition line for values of 0.2 ≤ µ1 ≤ 0.4. In this range, the transition line is largely independent
of the value r10. It basically coincides with the transition line for ρ∗single, the fraction of failed
nodes for single layer networks.
For values of µ1 larger than 0.4 and for weak coupling, e.g. for r10 = 0.3, we observe in Fig. 5
(right, red line) that the transition line is no longer accurately described. The condition ρ∗single ≥
ρcs,1 = 0.55 gives only an upper bound for the transition line, but not a lower one. We observe
that already cascade sizes of ρ∗single ≥ 0.45 lead to large cascade amplification on layer 0, due to
nonlinear effects. I.e. the green dotted line in Fig. 5 (right) gives an almost perfect match with
the numerically calculated transition line.
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That means, we can even generalize our statement that the transition line for ρ∗single determines
the phase transition. This holds not only for small µ1, but also for larger µ1 and a broad range
of the coupling strength r10.
5 Conclusions
Our paper essentially addresses the problem of whether systemic risk is increased or decreased if,
instead of a single-layer network, a two-layer representation is used. In the latter, the nodes of the
network appear on two layers 0 and 1 with different properties. Specifically, they have different
degree distributions p0 (k0), p1 (k1) and different threshold distributions F0 (θ0), F1 (θ1). There is
an asymmetric coupling between the two layers such that nodes that failed on layer 0 also fail on
layer 1. However, nodes that did not fail on layer 0, may still fail on layer 1 because of a cascade
dynamics on layer 1. In this case, their failing threshold on layer 0 is reduced by a fraction r10,
where r10 denotes the coupling strength between the two layers.
The mutual feedback between the two layers can then result in the amplification of failure
cascades, which we study analytically. We can calculate a variable ρ∗l which is the final fraction
of failed nodes on each layer l ∈ {0, 1}. Our measure of systemic risk is ρ∗ ≡ ρ∗0, i.e. we only
consider whether nodes have failed on layer 0. Obviously, if r10 is small, no failure cascade
in layer 1 can propagate to layer 0. In this case, whether or not we observe failure cascades
only depends on the conditions in layer 0. These conditions are expressed by the parameters of
the threshold distribution, µ0 and σ0, which are chosen so that no failure cascade occurs. By
varying r10, we then study the impact of failures on layer 1 on failures on layer 0. We derive
an analytical approach to calculate ρ∗l , which leads to a system of coupled fixed point equations
solved numerically.
Our results are visualized by means of phase diagrams that show, for various parameter constella-
tions, the value of the main risk measure ρ∗ = ρ∗0. The most prominent feature is the existence of
a very sharp phase transition between a regime of no systemic risk and a regime of full collapse.
This means that small changes in the parameters µ1 and σ1, describing the threshold distribution
on layer 1, can lead to an abrupt regime shift. Our task was then to approximate this line of
transition in terms of the coupling strength r10 and the parameters of the threshold distribution.
Subsequently, we use these insights to compare the systemic risk in single-layer and two-layer
networks.
The derivation of mathematical approximations for the phase transitions that are compared,
and confirmed, by numerical solutions of the full problem has a value on its own. Here, we focus
on the conclusions that can be made based on these calculations. First of all, we understand
that systemic risk is reduced in the two-layer network only if the coupling strength between the
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two layers is rather small. Above a critical value rc10 = 0.2, which is also estimated analytically,
failures on layer 1 are amplified on layer 0 and thus lead to an increase of the systemic risk. If
we compare this with the reference case of a single layer network, we find that the systemic risk
is smaller there, for most ranges of the parameters. Hence, above a critical coupling, it is not
beneficial to split the network into two layers, if systemic risk shall be mitigated.
Our findings can be applied to a scenario where firms have to decide whether to split their
business into a less risky core business, essential for their survival, and a subsidiary business,
which can be more risky. Such a split leads to the representation of the (same) firm on two
different levels 0 and 1, where the latter has a larger risk of failure cascades. This decision only
leads to less failure risk for the firm if the coupling between the core business layer and the
subsidiary business layer is weak enough. Close to the transition line between the no-risk and
the high-risk regime, slight changes in the firms’ failure thresholds or in the coupling between
the different businesses may potentially cause the system to collapse completely.
There is another important conclusion to be drawn for firms that already have their activities split
between a less risky core business and a more risky subsidiary business. If such firms estimate
systemic risk based on an aggregated network representation with only one layer instead of
the two-layer representation, they may systematically underestimate the real risk, in particular
if the coupling is still strong. As we have shown, under such conditions the systemic risk in
the aggregated network is lower than in the two-layer network. Hence, there can be drastic
consequences from drawing conclusions based on an inappropriate aggregated picture.
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